Azure role assignments can give users more access than expected because permissions accumulate across direct assignments, group memberships and inherited scopes. Adding Reader at resource level does not restrict Contributor inherited from a subscription. Removing 1 assignment may therefore leave the same access available through another route.
The starting point is effective access, not the role displayed beside a user’s name. Review the identity, role definition, assignment scope and alternative access paths before changing permissions.
Why a narrower assignment does not reduce access
Azure role-based access control (RBAC) connects a security principal, such as a user or application, to a role at a particular scope. Effective permissions normally combine all applicable assignments, subject to conditions and deny assignments.
Permissions accumulate across scopes
Azure scopes form a hierarchy: management group, subscription, resource group and individual resource. Permissions assigned higher in that hierarchy flow down to resources beneath them.
A resource-level Reader assignment therefore cannot override subscription-level Contributor. To reduce access, remove or narrow the broader assignment where it originates. The same applies when several groups grant overlapping permissions.
Custom-role NotActions entries also are not explicit denials. They subtract permissions from that role definition, but another applicable role can grant those operations.
Resource management and data access differ
Management-plane permissions control resources; data-plane permissions control their contents. Reader does not automatically grant permission to read blobs, whilst Storage Blob Data Reader addresses blob data access.
However, management permissions may expose another route. A role that permits retrieving storage account keys can enable data access through those keys where Shared Key authorisation remains enabled. Removing a data role alone does not close that path.
What the main Azure roles actually allow
Azure RBAC includes over 100 built-in roles, including 5 fundamental roles. The familiar fundamental roles are the Owner role, Contributor role and Reader role, and they apply across all resource types.
These roles separate resource administration from access administration.
| Role | Main permissions | Can assign Azure roles? |
|---|---|---|
| Owner | Manage all resources and access | Yes |
| Contributor | Manage all resources | No |
| Reader | View resources without changing them | No |
| Role Based Access Control Administrator | Manage Azure RBAC access | Yes |
| User Access Administrator | Manage user access to Azure resources | Yes |
Contributor is not a restricted operational role simply because it cannot assign roles. At subscription scope, it provides extensive resource-management permissions.
The 2 access-administration roles also require protection: unrestricted delegation can permit assignments of highly privileged roles. Select the permissions required for the task, rather than relying on a reassuring role name.
Trace Azure role assignments in the portal
Start at the resource where access appears excessive, then trace permissions upwards. The Access control (IAM) page is available on management groups, subscriptions, resource groups and individual resources.

Identify direct, group and inherited permissions
Use the following sequence:
- Open the relevant resource and select Access control (IAM).
- Select Check access, find the user and inspect applicable assignments.
- Review Role assignments, including group-based and inherited entries, then open the parent scope responsible for broader access.
Record the principal object ID, role, scope and assignment source. Display names alone are insufficient, particularly where applications or groups have similar names.
Account for delegated administration
A customer-tenant listing is not a complete inventory when Azure Lighthouse is involved. Assignments authorised through the service provider are not displayed there, and service-provider users cannot see customer-tenant assignments.
Microsoft documents this limitation in its portal role-assignment guidance. Review Lighthouse delegations separately rather than treating an empty IAM result as proof that a supplier has no access.
List assignments with Azure CLI
Use the correct tenant and subscription before interpreting results. In these commands, $USER_ID is the user’s object ID, $RG is the resource-group name and $SCOPE is the full Azure scope ID.
Choose the command that matches the investigation.
| Investigation | Azure CLI command |
|---|---|
| User across the current subscription and below | az role assignment list --assignee "$USER_ID" --all --include-inherited --include-groups |
| Resource group, including inherited access | az role assignment list --resource-group "$RG" --include-inherited |
| Subscription or individual resource | az role assignment list --scope "$SCOPE" --include-inherited |
| Management group | az role assignment list --scope "/providers/Microsoft.Management/managementGroups/$MG" --include-inherited |
--assignee selects the identity. --all includes the current subscription and child scopes; --include-inherited adds parent-scope assignments. --include-groups includes transitive group assignments for the user.
Microsoft’s CLI listing documentation distinguishes these switches. None makes a single query tenant-wide.
Inspect JSON fields such as principalId, principalType, roleDefinitionName, roleDefinitionId, scope and condition. Use az role definition list --output table to list available role definitions.
An Unknown principal can indicate a deleted identity or insufficient directory permissions to resolve its details. Match the object ID against Entra users, groups, service principals and each managed identity before deleting the assignment. Recreating an identity with the same name does not restore its original object ID.
Create a scoped assignment and test the result
Assignment creation requires Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write at the target scope, normally through an appropriate access-administration role. Contributor alone is insufficient.
Assign with Azure CLI
For Reader access at resource group scope, set $SCOPE to /subscriptions/$SUBSCRIPTION_ID/resourceGroups/$RG, using the actual subscription ID and resource-group name.
Then run:
az role assignment create --assignee-object-id "$USER_ID" --assignee-principal-type User --role acdd72a7-3385-48ef-bd42-f606fba81ae7 --scope "$SCOPE"
The GUID identifies Reader. Use the appropriate principal type when assigning a group or service principal. Microsoft’s CLI assignment instructions cover these parameters.
List the assignments again, including inherited and group access. A successful creation response proves that the assignment exists, not that the user’s total permissions match the intention.
Use the Az PowerShell equivalents
List user assignments with Get-AzRoleAssignment -ObjectId $USER_ID -ExpandPrincipalGroups. For a resource group, use Get-AzRoleAssignment -ResourceGroupName $RG.
Create the equivalent Reader assignment with New-AzRoleAssignment -ObjectId $USER_ID -RoleDefinitionId acdd72a7-3385-48ef-bd42-f606fba81ae7 -Scope $SCOPE.
Test both the intended operation and an operation that should remain unavailable. Allow for propagation and cached authorisation before interpreting an immediate result.
Reduce standing access without leaving inherited permissions
Applying least privilege means reviewing role selection, assignment scope and duration separately. Changing one factor doesn’t remove other access paths.

Use groups and limit subscription owners
Assign roles to groups rather than individual users where suitable. This reduces assignment numbers, helps stay within per-subscription assignment limits and makes joiner, mover and leaver changes more manageable.
Group ownership and membership administration still need controls. Anyone authorised to add members may grant the group’s resource permissions.
Microsoft recommends a maximum of 3 subscription owners to reduce exposure if an owner is compromised. Microsoft Defender for Cloud can monitor this recommendation through its Azure RBAC security practices.
Separate eligibility from active access
Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) provides just-in-time privileged access to Entra ID and Azure resources. Where your setup allows it, you can activate an eligible privileged administrator role when needed rather than leave it permanently active. Time-bound access expires automatically, but configuring PIM doesn’t remove existing permanent assignments.
Configure Azure resource policies under PIM > Azure resources, separately from Entra directory-role policies. Our PIM configuration guidance explains the distinction.
Include eligible access, active assignments and group memberships in reviews. Retain decisions and evidence of completed removal, as described in our Microsoft 365 access review guidance.
Constrain automation that can assign roles
An Azure DevOps service connection may use a service principal to create assignments. Giving that identity unrestricted Owner or access-administrator permissions can exceed the deployment’s requirements.
A custom role named Role Assignment Writer can contain only Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write. That limits available operations, but unrestricted assignment-writing can still permit privilege escalation. Read operations, deletion or other deployment tasks may require separate permissions.
Apply role assignment conditions to restrict permitted RoleDefinitionId GUIDs, such as those for Service Bus Data Sender and Service Bus Data Receiver. Built-in role GUIDs are consistent across Azure tenants.
Use unique role IDs in scripts because names can change, including when preview roles reach release. Avoid wildcards in custom-role Actions and DataActions: future operations could otherwise become authorised without another role change.
After deployment, inspect the assigned scope and condition. Test that permitted assignments succeed and an Owner assignment fails.
Key takeaways
- Review inherited and group permissions before removing direct Azure role assignments.
- Restrict both the role and its scope; a narrower additional assignment does not reduce existing access.
- Include eligible access, automation identities and alternative credentials when reviewing permissions.
Frequently asked questions
Are Azure roles the same as Microsoft Entra roles?
No. Azure roles govern resources such as virtual machines and subscriptions; Microsoft Entra roles govern directory administration.
A Global Administrator can open Microsoft Entra ID > Properties > Access management for Azure resources and select Yes. This grants User Access Administrator at root scope, covering all subscriptions and management groups associated with the tenant. Set it back to No when elevation is no longer required.
Do classic administrator roles still apply?
Classic roles retired on 31 August 2024, as Microsoft’s Azure account comparison records. Historical limits were 1 Account Administrator per account, 1 Service Administrator per subscription and 200 Co-Administrators per subscription.
Azure RBAC uses the Azure portal and Azure Resource Manager APIs, including through CLI and PowerShell, rather than classic deployment-model APIs.
Make effective access the completion point
An assignment change is complete when the remaining permissions match the business requirement. Record the authorised role, scope, access paths and evidence that unnecessary permissions have been removed.
Our IT security services can help review Azure permissions alongside identity controls and cloud configuration. If access no longer matches responsibilities, speak to us about establishing a documented review and remediation process.




